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1South Asia’s Persistent Cold War
Rajesh Basrur
The end of the Soviet–U.S. Cold War shook the discipline of international relations as no other event had done
in the half-century since World War II. The utter failure of international relations theory to anticipate the
dramatic changes that occurred in the late 1980s was the subject of a powerful attack on the validity of the
theoretical enterprise itself.1 While it is generally recognized that it is not the business of theory to anticipate
particular events, but rather to specify the conditions under which events can be expected to occur, it was
nevertheless true that theorists had failed to examine the scope for change systematically, and that “measured by
its own standards, the profession’s performance was embarrassing”.2 The truth of the matter is that the
profession had not looked for the conditions that might bring an end to the Cold War.
A somewhat similar situation exists with regard to the cold war between India and Pakistan.3 When the
Cold War drew to a close, regional conflicts in Southeast Asia, Southwest Africa, and later the Middle East
began to unwind. In the expectation that an opportunity is at hand for bringing peace to South Asia, a number of
analysts have offered diverse solutions to the region’s conflict, but without careful inquiry into the range of
potential factors that might alter the politics of the subcontinent. Theory was not properly applied to anticipate
the end of the Soviet–U.S. conflict. The same error is being made with respect to South Asia. This paper
assesses the future of South Asia’s persistent cold war, and the conditions under which it is likely to recede, in
theoretical terms, so that, in this case at least, we might not be surprised.
In undertaking this exercise, I adopt a modified realist perspective. Broad patterns of state behavior can be
best understood in terms of the structure of the international system, which is defined as the outcome of anarchy
among states and the distribution of power among them.4 Anarchy or the absence of a central authority makes
states self-centered and power-seeking, thereby limiting their scope for cooperation. Power distribution
determines state preferences in balancing, alliance making, distancing, and other state strategies. However,
realism does not adequately explain important behavioral anomalies, such as war-avoidance between nuclear
powers and economic cooperation among states that are highly competitive.5 A modified formulation of realism
explains these anomalies by incorporating the conflict-mitigating effects of high levels of interaction among
states. When interactions among states become very intense (regardless of whether the interactions are hostile,
as with nuclear confrontation, or cooperative, as in the case of economic exchanges), the role of structure
recedes and cooperation results.6 This explains the extensive cooperation between the United States and the
Soviet Union before the end of the Cold War, notably the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), despite rising economic tension among the United States,
Japan, and the European Union.
In the light of this modified realist stance, what might one prognosticate about the relations between India
and Pakistan? Following a brief survey of past India–Pakistan relations, I examine the structural and
interactional potentialities for change. The picture that emerges belies the optimism of those expecting early
                                                            
1
.
 John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” International Security, 17:3 (Winter 1992/93): 5–
58.
2
. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Introduction: International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” in
Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1995), p. 2.
3
. While distinguishing between the U.S.–Soviet “Cold War” and the South Asian “cold war,” I do not attempt a comparative analysis of
the two (a more complex exercise), but focus only on applying a specific theoretical perspective to the second. In either case, I use the term
to mean a hostile relationship characterized by constant tension as well as war-avoidance. The latter, which does not preclude covert
intervention across the border, is the product of the “opaque” nuclearization of both countries.
4
. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
5
. Waltz’s structural theory, which treats interactions as exogenous to structure, is inherently incapable of accommodating these
anomalies, notably extensive Soviet–American strategic cooperation and Japanese–American economic cooperation.
6
. Rajesh M. Basrur, “Structure and Interaction in the Global System,” International Studies, 31:4 (October 1994): 377–97. Here, the
intensity of interactions, which is not a property of states, but stands apart from them, is treated as a systemic variable.
2 Rajesh Basrur
change, but nevertheless shows that, in the long run, the relationship will move in the direction of greater
cooperation. In the concluding section, I evaluate a number of proposals seeking to mitigate, perhaps even end,
cold war tensions in South Asia.
The India–Pakistan Security Dilemma
The history of conflict between India and Pakistan is too well known to need detailed recounting. Because of
the trauma of Partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three wars in 1948, 1965, and 1971, the last
causing the dismemberment of Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh. In the quarter-century since, there has been
peace of a sort, marred by tensions over cross-border intervention in internal ethnic conflicts, periodic
exchanges of fire over a long and partly undelineated border, and the development of both countries’ nuclear
and missile programs. Aside from the accumulated weight of history, the main sources of discord between them
are three.
First, neither country has put behind it the trauma of communal conflict and Partition. Both carry into the
present a sense of vulnerability about national identity. India, with a self-image of itself as a secular state, is
experiencing the rise of religious fundamentalism that seriously undermines its putative identity as a society
characterized by “unity in diversity.” The mere existence of Pakistan is a constant reminder of its weakness in
this respect, as is the frequency of domestic Hindu–Muslim violence. Pakistan, created on the basis of the
assertion that the subcontinent’s Muslims have a unique and independent political identity of their own, has yet
to come to terms with the sundering of its Bengali population, which cut at the root of its religio-political
identity. In addition, the uncomfortable fact is that India has a larger population of Muslims than does Pakistan.
These insecurities have a focal point in the vexing issue of Kashmir that, in a sense, has come to challenge the
raison d’être of each. The tussle over Kashmir represents a struggle for identity in which the insecurities of the
one are exacerbated by the claims of the other—a classic example of the security dilemma at work. This is not
to say that a resolution of the Kashmir dispute will bring an end to Indo–Pakistani tensions. But, in the event
that a solution is found, it would certainly reduce the overall level of tension in the region.
For that to happen, both India and Pakistan would have to develop a degree of internal cohesiveness that is
absent today. Neither has known sustained social and political stability since 1947. Besides a period of political
repression in the seventies, India has experienced recurrent outbreaks of violence among religious, caste, and
linguistic groups and separatist movements in the northeast, Punjab, and Kashmir. Pakistan has undergone long
periods of military rule, regular sectarian tensions, and militant movements in Baluchistan, the North West
Frontier Province, and Sindh. Governments hard put to resolve their internal difficulties have been inclined to
point their fingers across the border, not always without justification. So long as there is social turmoil and
political uncertainty within each polity, cross-border tensions are bound to reign high. Moreover, given that the
region is undergoing a period of economic change, which invariably weakens existing social structures and
generates crises, it seems likely that both countries will tend to bolster the identity of the “self” in opposition to
the “other.”
Finally, the structure of the India–Pakistan relationship makes rapprochement problematic. In accordance
with the modified realist standpoint outlined earlier, the two countries may be treated as major powers in the
South Asian system, with India as the dominant or “hegemonic” power and Pakistan the “challenger” resisting
Indian dominance.7 In their respective systemic “roles,” the two exhibit typical behavioral characteristics.8 India
tends to play the role of regional security manager, resists external involvement in South Asia, prefers bilateral
negotiation, and favors closer economic and cultural relations with Pakistan. It also feels the necessity of
maintaining a regional power “balance” to its advantage. Pakistan’s preferences are the opposite. It tries to
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internationalize disputes with India, seeks to strengthen itself by obtaining strategic support from outside the
system, and avoids close economic and cultural relations with India.
The dynamics of the South Asian system are inevitably affected by the policies and actions of extra-
systemic powers pursuing their own interests. During the Cold War, the United States bolstered Pakistan as an
ally against the Soviet Union by supplying it with weapons. The resultant strengthening of Pakistan’s position
face-to-face with India led the latter to depend on the Soviet Union for a proportional increase in its power.
China’s support for Pakistan, aimed at the containment of India, had a similar effect. However, barring a brief
period between 1966 and mid-1971, when India was isolated as the Soviet Union seemed to be reconsidering its
commitment to India, external involvement did not alter the power equation in South Asia, although the inflow
of weapons did intensify regional tensions.
The end of the Cold War has changed both countries’ options. India has lost its Soviet card. Pakistan can
extract relatively little from the U.S. and continuing military aid, but not strong political support, from China.
Chinese aid undoubtedly enhances Pakistan’s power, but it would be hard to argue that it changes the equation
in South Asia. In essence, the strategic relationship between India and Pakistan remains the same. Analysts have
posited one major change. The acquisition of nuclear capability by Pakistan effectively nullifies India’s clear
superiority in conventional weapons. In a pure military sense, because India and Pakistan appear to deter each
other, the structure of the system appears to have changed.9 But there is a caveat here. To the extent that neither
side has clearly demonstrated and deployed its nuclear capability, conventional war is improbable rather than
highly unlikely and cannot be ruled out. In this sense, India retains a balance-of-power advantage. As regards
economic power, India is clearly far ahead. Thus the structure of the system is still that of Indian dominance.
Even if existential deterrence in South Asia were to be granted, the hostility between India and Pakistan would
still be sustained by the “deep structure” of the system—anarchy—that drives states to accumulate power and
be inimical to that of others. Expectations of a transformation of the Indo–Pakistani relationship must be backed
either by a change in structure or by a change in the relationship such that the effects of structure are mitigated.
As noted at the outset, the latter can happen when interaction intensifies.
Potential Sources of Change
Structural Sources
Three major possibilities can be readily identified. First, anarchy itself might disappear. More precisely, it is
conceivable that the state of anarchy between India and Pakistan will cease to exist if the two countries are
amalgamated into one political unit. The probability of such an event is negligible: there are no visible
indicators of integration at present. In the long run, however, amalgamation cannot be ruled out because,
notwithstanding disintegrative tendencies at the local level, regional integration into larger units does seem to be
the secular trend in world politics. But that is at best a distant possibility.
A second and somewhat less improbable structural change would be the disintegration or near-collapse of
either India or Pakistan, which would dramatically alter the distribution of power in the subcontinent.
Something of the kind occurred when Mikhail Gorbachev, in an effort to revitalize a country threatened with
entropy, launched a process of restructuring that ended the Cold War as well as one of its two protagonists. In
the subcontinental cold war, the rivals are certainly vulnerable. India has recently undertaken the difficult task
of transforming itself from a controlled autarky to a liberal economy integrated with global capitalism. Such
fundamental change carries with it the risk of political and social upheaval of the kind that periodically
convulsed Europe during the process of industrialization from the late eighteenth century to the middle of the
twentieth, particularly when popular forces were mobilized to political action. As noted, Indian society has seen
repeated outbursts of social and political violence that have raised serious questions about the viability of the
state. This has occurred in spite of its relative insularity from the ups and downs of the global economy.
Integration with the latter now makes it increasingly vulnerable to external shocks such as sudden changes in
exchange rates, stock market crashes, and rapid capital flight. Indeed, the global economy itself has become
more and more difficult to regulate as the transfer of information and of money has become increasingly
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independent of state authority. Many developing countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Nigeria
have, in undertaking their transformation to liberal capitalism, experienced severe economic problems,
especially high levels of inflation, followed by political crises.
So far, India has managed change prudently. But it is conceivable that exogenous shocks will destabilize
the political framework and cause it to deteriorate. In that event, either of two possible outcomes may follow.
The country may disintegrate into two or more political units; or it may survive in seriously debilitated form
like the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. In either case, the structure of the South Asian system will
have been transformed. All of the above applies at least as much to Pakistan, which is even more vulnerable to
disintegration because of its weaker political institutions. It is also possible that, unable to bear the strain of
military competition with India, which eats up much of its resources, Pakistan may go the way of the Soviet
Union and throw in the towel. One Pakistani analyst has warned as much.10
The structural change envisaged here would dissolve the enduring hostility between India and Pakistan, but
there is good reason to believe that it is unlikely to occur. States do not die easily. The former communist states
that disintegrated did so speedily because of the sudden shift from totalitarian systems to relatively loose
systems of political control and because their earlier solidarity was a veneer based on an ideology the citizenry
never internalized. The same cannot be said of India and Pakistan, whose people were mobilized in popular
movements in the creation of a national identity that, however tenuous, has been built on a modicum of
democratic experience. In particular, India has shown a remarkable capacity to absorb fissiparous pressures by
combining repression with accommodation. Notwithstanding their propensity for instability, their capacity to
survive should not be underestimated.
A third structural possibility is the emergence of a common threat, which could push India and Pakistan
into a strategic alliance against a third state. If such a threat were to arise, it would come from outside the
region, because no other South Asian state has the potential to cause anxiety in India and Pakistan. Historically,
this kind of threat has brought about strategic alliances among formerly hostile states on many occasions.
Britain and France drew closer following the rise of German power in the late nineteenth century. The United
States and the Soviet Union became allies as a result of Hitler’s aggression. The many regional tensions in
Southeast Asia were defused by the Chinese threat, which led to the birth of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). Along the same lines, India and Pakistan might conceivably come together if there were a
significant threat from a neighboring country. For instance, if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons and assume
a threatening posture toward Pakistan, it would be in India’s interest to back the latter, because the
disintegration of Pakistan might have a spillover effect. Or, a resurgent Russia expanding into Central Asia
could bring about a turnaround in Indo–Pakistani relations.
While these possibilities cannot be ruled out, they are also not very likely to occur. In the first place,
Pakistan is in a position to deter external threats unilaterally because of its acquisition of nuclear capability.
Second, Pakistan (for that matter, India too) has an option other than strategic alliance with its long-standing
adversary: recourse to support from an outside power such as China or the United States.
Clearly, the scope for structural change in India–Pakistan relations is very limited. It is often argued that
democracies do not fight, and from this one might infer that the trend toward mature democracy, if sustained,
will steadily soothe their troubled relations. However, the evidence on this is insufficient. Moreover, in the late
1980s, despite the growth of democratic trends in Pakistan, there was no discernible improvement in Indo–
Pakistani relations. On the contrary, the most serious post-1971 crises—over Kashmir in 1990—occurred after
Pakistan’s democratization. It is also arguable that the ties that truly bind democracies together are economic
rather than ideological. Indeed, the two kinds of states that do not fight are highly integrated industrial
economies and nuclear powers. In either case, the concerned states are highly interdependent. Intense
interactions impel them to cooperate despite structural pressures to the contrary.
Interactional Sources of Change
The deployment of nuclear weapons and economic integration are potential sources of cooperation between
India and Pakistan. Nuclear weapons, by virtue of their immense destructive power, dramatically alter the
structure of a system. Having a wide qualitative and quantitative margin over one’s adversary does not bring
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advantage in the way that it does in the conventional sphere, although most U.S. and Soviet–Russian strategists
have been slow to recognize this. A small nuclear power can “balance” a large one. But peace based on balance
of power can and does break down. The unique quality of nuclear weapons is that, unlike conventional
weapons, they produce a powerful urge among their possessors to go well beyond classical balancing behavior:
they generate policies designed to avoid their use altogether. In this sense, they have an effect that is not
structural, but interactional. Because of their devastating power, they create intense strategic interaction by their
mere existence. The interdependence that is generated compels their possessors to override structural pressures
toward conflict and cooperate in order not to use them, a process that encompasses arms control and
disarmament.
The nuclearization of South Asia, although incomplete in its current “opaque” form, appears to have
created a deterrent balance that negates India’s conventional superiority. This is true not so much in an objective
sense, because the capabilities of both India and Pakistan are unclear, but in the sense that decision-making
circles in these countries believe that “existential deterrence” is already in place.11 Regional stability rests on
“virtual arsenals” rather than on deployed nuclear weapons.12 This stability is not firmly grounded, although it
has been claimed that India and Pakistan are undergoing a learning process that can, if sustained, build a stable
nuclear relationship.13 The fact that nuclear weapons are not deployed means that the intensity of strategic
interaction is not as high as it would be if they were deployed: the possibilities of use by miscalculation and of
accidental war are at present relatively low. The state of nonweaponized deterrence allows some level of risk-
taking and brinkmanship in the form of non-adherence to confidence-building measures previously agreed
upon, regular exchanges of fire and covert intervention in ethnic conflict. It is arguable that, if India and
Pakistan had their nuclear weapons overtly deployed, deterrence would be more stable: they would be
compelled to take measures to prevent war by miscalculation or accident. Weaponization would intensify their
strategic interaction and induce stabilizing measures. This, of course, is contrary to the conventional wisdom of
nonproliferationists; but the history of nuclear antagonists is also a history of war-avoidance.
How “peaceful” an overtly nuclearized subcontinent would be is an altogether different question. Nuclear
adversaries seek to prevent the outbreak of war, but in doing so, do not eliminate the causes of their hostility.
The prospect of reconciliation between a nuclear India and a nuclear Pakistan is remote. On the positive side,
the risks of conflict, including nuclear conflict, would be lower. At present, nuclear decision making in both
countries is extremely restricted and there does not appear to be any clear doctrinal understanding or strategy
related to nuclear weapons, let alone informed public debate. As Stephen P. Cohen puts it, there is no evidence
of the systematic development of doctrine, only of “half-doctrines” (more appropriately, “half-baked”
doctrines).14 The risk of nuclear weapons being used in a crisis, although remote, is still higher than it would be
if nuclear weapons were a deployed reality, in which case, their dangers better appreciated, they would be
discussed threadbare and surrounded by a zareba of caution.
But that is unlikely to happen. Although there are vocal proponents of weaponization in India and Pakistan,
and both countries have ample reason not to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, weaponization is not
cost-effective for either. A decision to deploy nuclear weapons overtly, or even to carry out a nuclear test,
would invite immediate sanctions from the international community.15 In particular, the U.S. Nuclear
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 imposes strong economic sanctions on proliferants: the U.S. government is
required, among other things, to deny credit and credit guarantees, oppose the extension of loans and technical
assistance by international institutions, prohibit U.S. banks from making loans or providing credit (except for
food or agricultural commodities), and disallow exports of specific goods and technology. Neither India nor
Pakistan can afford to overlook the costs that testing or deployment would entail. As against the potential cost
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of overt nuclearization, the potential gain is not significant. Because a state of deterrence is already believed to
exist, there is no major advantage in actually deploying nuclear weapons. With the potential costs outweighing
the potential benefits, it is highly improbable that overt nuclearization will occur in South Asia. This calculus is
likely to persist in the foreseeable future. Consequently, the state of India–Pakistan relations is unlikely to
change through the intensification of strategic interaction.
That leaves economic interaction as a potential source of positive change in South Asia. Until very
recently, the possibility of close interaction between India and Pakistan was virtually non-existent, for good
structural reasons. As the smaller and weaker of the two powers, Pakistan has rationally pursued a policy of
“moat-building” because interdependence among unequal states is really dependence of the weak upon the
strong. Pakistan has also had the external option of meeting its economic requirements by means of close
relations with the advanced industrial countries. There is certainly a demand for trade with India: unofficial
trade between India and Pakistan, mostly routed through Dubai, is currently estimated at about $ 1.5 billion a
year. In 1948–49, just after independence, India accounted for 56 percent of Pakistan’s exports and 32 percent
of its imports; today, the respective figures are just more than 1 percent and 0.7 percent.16 Pakistani officials
insist that they are keen to improve economic relations, but that the Kashmir dispute must be resolved first.
However, if political resolution is the necessary precursor to economic cooperation, then an end to the Kashmir
issue will not be a turning point because the structure of the India–Pakistan relationship will continue to be a
political obstacle.
Despite present political barriers, economic cooperation is likely to stem from economic compulsions.
Having liberalized their economies, India and Pakistan have become part of a global process of economic
change that has two central and inseparable features: integration and the transnational movement of knowledge.
This necessitates the loosening of political barriers to free economic exchange. For states, it means the
inevitable loss of autonomy and of control over their economic lives, but that is a necessary sacrifice because
the alternative is the retardation of growth and, ultimately, economic and hence military enfeeblement. The
process of change involves, among other things, the maximization of competitiveness, to which end states are
compelled to overcome long-standing inhibitions to free exchange relationships and to join hands with other
states in order to advance their economic interests as effectively as possible in the same way that competing
firms have already begun to do. To be competitive, states must seek the expansion of economic ties with those
states that offer the most beneficial prospects in the form of trade, technology transfer, and joint ventures.
Despite its understandable caution, Pakistan’s interest lies in enhancing its economic ties with India through the
import of tea, coffee, iron ore, aluminum, and industrial equipment, the export of cotton and pig and scrap iron,
and a range of industrial joint ventures.17 It will change its policies with abundant caution, but the shift will
inevitably occur.
Some change is already under way. Pakistani officials today publicly recognize the potential gains from
closer economic relations with India. In January 1996, President Farooq Leghari, while harping on the primacy
of the Kashmir problem, stressed the positive prospects for regional development and poverty alleviation.18
India has granted Pakistan Most Favored Nation (MFN) status and awaits a Pakistani response. As members of
the World Trade Organization, both countries are subject to a common set of rules and procedures that propel
them in the direction of further liberalization and competitiveness. After a decade of ineffectual existence, the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), of which they are key members, has created the
South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA), which grants members tariff relief. In the long run,
economic relations between India and Pakistan are likely to grow and they may gradually “be constrained to
move toward cooperative and away from unilateralist security measures”.19
Economic exchange, however, does not necessarily translate quickly into political understanding. New
interactions can also bring into play new sources of tension. Disputes between India and Pakistan will in all
likelihood arise over a range of new issues such as market access, dumping, informal trade barriers, and
reciprocity. Along with economic cooperation will come the acrimony arising from competitiveness and
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accompanying “neo-mercantilist” pressures.20 The relationship between the United States and China is
illustrative of this combination of cooperation and conflict, in which two countries need each other, but are also
highly competitive and mutually suspicious . Only when economic relations are highly interdependent do
disputes remain in the realm of economics instead of taking on a strategic character. India–Pakistan relations are
for this reason likely, in spite of an economic breakthrough, to remain troubled for a fairly long period of time.
Conclusion
The picture that emerges from this analysis is that there is little scope in the near term for the
transformation of India–Pakistan relations from hostility to camaraderie. Neither the structural nor the
interactional factors identified point in the direction of significant positive change, although it must be said that
sudden and unforeseeable structural changes of the sort identified earlier are always possible. On the other hand,
it is also unlikely that the situation will deteriorate significantly. Existential deterrence makes war improbable,
and economic necessity is propelling the adversaries in the direction of a relationship that, while generating new
tensions, will compel them to cooperate. Indian and Pakistani decision makers will have to learn to cope with an
increasingly complex environment calling for nuance thinking. There is no reason to believe that they will not
be able to respond adequately over time.
This places in perspective the range of thinking that has concerned itself with the alleviation of tension in
South Asia, much of it driven by fears of a regional nuclear conflagration. The ideas offered may be divided
into two: transformative proposals and incremental ones. Transformative proposals envisage radical change in
South Asia. Sunil Dasgupta has outlined a scheme for powerful economic incentives in the form of consortium
aid for infrastructural development to India and Pakistan.21 The idea is a provocative one, envisaging the
extension of the nonproliferation regime to South Asia through irresistible economic inducement. But it does
not adequately address the structurally-rooted hostility between the two countries and the political risks
confronting decision makers who might consider such an option seriously. Another incentive-based plan, put
forward by David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, proposes that the United States undertake a South Asia policy
that would liberalize export controls on dual-use technologies, ease debt burdens, promote economic
liberalization, and sponsor a phased resolution of the Kashmir dispute.22 The difficulty again is that the proposal
does not show how the structural sources of the adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan can be
overridden, except as an act of political will, which is an insufficient basis for anticipating dramatic change in
international politics.
Even less realistic is the notion that substantive change for the better can be expected through people-to-
people interaction.23 While it is true that knowledge often removes misperceptions and helps dissolve
stereotypical images, it does not by itself alter interests. It is the divergence of interests between India and
Pakistan that is the root of their animosity and which breeds misperception, rather than the other way round.
Similarly, the idea that political confidence-building can precede the resolution of difficult and long-standing
political antagonism is overly optimistic.24 It is doubtless useful for adversaries to talk to each other on a regular
basis. This keeps open a channel of communication and puts in place a process that can be of utility in
reinforcing technical confidence building measures (CBMs) as well as providing a vehicle for negotiation when
there is scope for substantial change in the relationship. Beyond that, it is doubtful if political CBMs can in
themselves be the harbingers of good will.
Less ambitious (and more realistic) are proposals that recognize the limits to change and focus on
stabilizing the India–Pakistan relationship. The narrow approach taken by the U.S. government has tended to
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concentrate on the risks posed by nuclear proliferation and has largely confined itself to ways and means of
coercing India and Pakistan to cap and eventually forego their respective nuclear and missile capabilities.25
Other analyses, recognizing the South Asians’ security concerns and the element of stability conferred by their
nuclear capabilities, argue that the risks of weaponization and missile deployment demand a series of stabilizing
measures. The United States should therefore continue to try and freeze the nuclear status quo in the
subcontinent, to which end it ought, in addition to existing policies, offer technical assistance and other
inducements to stability to India and Pakistan and encourage strategic dialogue between them.26 To the extent
that the proposals are contingent upon the acquiescence of India and Pakistan to U.S. nonproliferation
objectives, it is to be expected that they will come to nought because it is hard to imagine either of the two
governments abandoning the nuclear option. Otherwise, at worst they can do no harm; at best they can
genuinely contribute to the stabilization of a cold war relationship that will in all likelihood continue for some
time to come.
This paper has sought to identify and evaluate in theoretical terms the scope for positive change in the
acrimonious relationship between India and Pakistan. While it cannot be ruled out, structural change is
improbable. Change in the form of heightened strategic interaction may actually bring greater stability, but is
also unlikely. The only realistic expectation is with regard to the intensification of Indo–Pakistani economic
relations. But it would be simplistic to assume that growing economic ties would necessarily bring to an end the
tensions in the subcontinent. These tensions will in all probability remain for some time, and can at best be
assuaged by pragmatic and incremental approaches to stabilization uncluttered by excessive expectations of an
early end to the subcontinent’s cold war merely because the bigger Cold War is over.
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